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Abstract
Reproductive externalities are important for fertility behaviour in Kenya. We iden-
tify from anthropology structural forms of social interaction operating across individ-
uals belonging to different ethnic and religious groups on the number of children ever
born. We use the 1998 Demographic and Health Survey, combined with primary mete-
orological data on Kenya, and GMM methods, to show that social interactions effects
by ethnicity are important over and above an individual’s characteristics such as their
religion to explain variations in fertility. Our findings have implications for policy de-
bates in Kenya and in other developing countries about ethnic, religious and other
differences in fertility behavior.
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1 Introduction
Both economists and demographers examine the balance between economic and non-economic
factors in orchestrating a fertility transition, as witnessed in historical European popula-
tions and in some East Asian economies over relatively short periods of time. Classic
studies of fertility such as the Princeton Fertility Project highlight that the transition to
low fertility in historical European populations occurred in a variety of socio-economic and
institutional contexts, with a significant role being played by the local social environment
(Coale and Watkins (1986), Federici, Mason, and Sogner (1993)). More recent studies have
emphasised the role of the social climate and the influence of social interactions on de-
mographic behaviour (Manski and Mayshar (2003), Munshi and Myaux (2006)). These
empirical findings have led many economists to focus on modelling the influence of social
interactions on contemporary fertility transitions (Durlauf and Walker (1999); Manski and
Mayshar (2002)) and on the reproductive externalities and coordination failures associated
with fertility behaviour per se ((Dasgupta (2000); Kohler (2001); Iyer and Velu (2006)).
The total fertility rate in Kenya fell from an average of 6 births per woman in 1948
(Ajayi and Kekovole (1998)) to approximately 4.56 in 2010 (CIA (2010)). However, the
most significant declines in fertility occurred over a twenty year period: the DHS studies
conducted in 1989, 1993 and 1998 showed that the TFR dropped from 6.7 in 1989 and
5.4 in 1993 to 4.7 in 1998. This drop in fertility is considered one of the most dramatic
recorded anywhere in the developed and developing world (Ajayi and Kekovole (1998): 116;
Robinson 1992). So it is useful to examine how fertility declined in this society. Moreover,
our focus on ethnicity and fertility in Kenya mirrors policy discussions in Kenya that
surrounded the release of the controversial Kenya Census figures in 2010 which included
ethnicity and tribal affiliations for the first time, following the ethnic tensions of 2007-
2008. In light of the sensitivity of these issues, we focus our study of ethnicity, religion and
fertility, and our data, on an earlier period in Kenya’s demographic history.
Our focus on religion and fertility is motivated by a wider demographic literature that
has argued that this issue needs further investigation in developing country contexts (Iyer
2002; Iyer (2019)). In a broad context fertility is higher across the world for Muslims than
for Christians (Iyer 2019).This paper presents a context where both Muslims and Christians
co-exist, but there are also ethnic differences which may swamp the religious differences.
Kenya is a country which displays a great deal of heterogeneity by ethnicity but also by
religion. In fact, it is a very interesting example of a society in which religion and ethnicity
have interacted to influence behaviours. While ethnic groups have predated the influence of
religions like Christianity and Islam in Kenya, there are also indigenous religions here which
are less common now, but which predate Christianity and Islam. Hence it is quite useful
also to examine how historically well-defined social groups, whether delianated by religion
or ethnicity, or both, interact with each other to influence outcomes such as demographic
behavior.
Economists consider the impact of social interactions within predetermined groups (Ak-
erlof (1997); Brock and Durlauf (2000), Brock and Durlauf (2001)), and how group forma-
tion results from social interactions with particular emphasis on residential neighbourhoods,
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geographic proximity and dynamic group formation (Borjas (1995); Ginther, Haverman,
and Wolfe (2000); Conley and Topa (2002)). Our study examines social interactions in
predetermined groups in Kenya such as religious groups and ethnic groups, that is moti-
vated by the anthropological literature on Kenya. Important previous studies which have
examined fertility rates and education in Africa have highlighted the significance of so-
cial interactions in Kenya (Behrman, Kohler, and Cotts-Watkins (2002), Kravdal (2002),
Rutenberg and Cotts-Watkins (1997))
In line with these studies, we conceive of the fertility of a Kenyan woman to be influ-
enced by a range of factors such as her individual characteristics and the characteristics
of the household to which she belongs. However, we also take these studies forward by
suggesting that the social environment impinges on a woman’s behaviour by multiple in-
teractions both at the household level and at the level of other reference groups such as
religion and ethnicity. We highlight a crucial point often overlooked in the theoretical and
empirical literature on this issue: namely that there are different levels at which social in-
teractions occur. In doing so we consider the possibility that both local and global forms of
social interaction may coexist (Horst and Scheinkman (2003a)). We quantify the effects of
social interactions and group membership on the number of children ever born, highlight-
ing whether these effects are mediated through household composition, ethnic affiliation,
religion, a neighbourhood cluster effect, timing effects, or some combination thereof.
In Section 2 we provide an overview of ethnic and religious groups in Kenya, highlighting
the characteristics which are relevant for fertility behaviour. Section 3 summarizes social
interactions and fertility behaviour including theory, measurement and estimation. Section
4 presents our demographic data. Section 5 discusses how we use unique district-level
rainfall data from Kenya’s meteorological rainfall stations over time to identify variations
in fertility by ethnic group. We discuss our results in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Anthropological overview of groups in Kenya
Social interactions and channels of message transmission about fertility behaviour are im-
portant at the level of ethnicity. Members of different ethnic groups speak the same lan-
guage, usually adopt similar cultural practices, and with some exceptions in border areas,
reside closely in the same, or in contiguous districts (Fapohunda and Poukouta (1997)).
In the specific case of Kenya it has been argued that cultural norms may encourage high
fertility but also contribute to fertility decline over time (Caldwell and Caldwell (1987);
Ascadi, Ascadi, and Bulatao (1990)). We argue that individuals’ multiple levels of social
interactions reflect their social identities - regional identities, ethnic identities, religious
identities, linguistic identities. While we do not explore the question of identity in this
paper, we do focus on how local and global interactions that arise from these identities,
significantly affect individuals’ behaviour. Our analysis is based upon historical and an-
thropological studies of Kenya with particular focus on the features of Kenya’s major ethnic
and religiious groups that have relevance for fertility behaviour. In this section we discuss
the groups with reference to their population composition, the region of their residence,
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and three characteristics of these groups which are noteworthy - their residential pattern
of settlement, clan organisation and education. These characteristics have implications for
the politics of fertility in Kenya.
Population The population of Kenya consists of three groups - the Africans, and to a
lesser extent, the Asians and Europeans. Although the last two groups mainly reside in
towns, 90% of the African population continues to live in rural areas (see Meck (1971)). The
tribal groups of rural Kenya live in clearly defined settlements in the more remote areas.
In the Lake Victoria basin, the highlands and the coast, there is a more heterogeneous
population structure (Morgan and Shaffer (1966):2; Meck (1971): 24). The tribes can be
defined broadly into four groups as classified by their language: the Bantu, the Nilotic, the
Nilo-Hamitic, and the Hamitic. Within these four broad language groups, ethnic groups
represent an additional sub-division. According to the original 1969 Population Census
there are 42 different ethnic African groups in Kenya (Rep (1970)). According to the most
recent 2009 Census, the five largest groups, accounting for over 75% of the population,
are the Kikuyu (17%), Kamba (10%), Kalenjin (13%), Luhya (14%) and Luo (10%(CIA
(2010)). Their population, according to recent controversial Kenyan census is the Kikuyu
at 6.6 million, the Luhya at 5.3 million, the Kalenjin at 4.9 million, the Luo at 4 million,
and the Kamba at 3.8 million (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics). There are also smaller
groups such as the Mijikenda (5%), Meru (4%), Turkana (2.5%), Maasai (2.1%). About
9% of the population are smaller indigenous group below 1% each, and the Arabs, Indians
and Europeans are about 1%.
The Kenyan population is 41 million in total in 2011, growing at an average growth
rate of more than 3% per year from 1980-2010 and at 2.7%CIA (2010). These Census data
from Kenya thus depict a steady increase in the total population of Kenya from 1948 to the
present. The total fertility rate in Kenya has fallen from an average of 6 births per woman
in 1948 (Ajayi and Kekovole (1998)) to approximately 4.56 in 2010 (CIA (2010)). However,
the most significant declines in fertility have occurred in the last twenty years: the DHS
studies conducted in 1989, 1993 and 1998 showed that the TFR dropped from 6.7 in 1989
and 5.4 in 1993 to 4.7 in 1998. This drop in fertility is considered one of the most dramatic
recorded anywhere in the developed and developing world (Ajayi and Kekovole (1998): 116;
Robinson 1992). The fertility differences by ethnic group are also very large, as shown in
Table 1. For women aged 15-49, the mean CEB varies from 2.5 for the Kikuyu to 3.5 for
the Luo. Previous studies of fertility and ethnicity in Kenya have revealed that desired
family size is smaller among the Kamba, Kikuyu, Luhya compared to the Luo (Fapohunda
and Poukouta (1997)). The Luo exhibit a strong preference for large families (although
this could also be driven by lower costs of children) and it is reported use contraception
much less than other groups ( Watkins, Rutenberg, and Green (1995)).
Religion The predominant religion in Kenya is Christianity (Pew (2019)). In 2019, an
estimated 84.8% of the total population of Kenya is Christian. Islam is the second largest
religion in Kenya, and practiced by 11.1% of the population. Other religious faiths observed
in Kenya today are the Baha’i faith, Buddhism, Hinduism and various traditional religions.
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Roman Catholicism first came to Kenya in the fifteenth century with the advent of the
Portuguese, and then spread rapidly during the 20th century due to missionary activity.
Today, the main Christian denominations in Kenya are Protestant and they comprise about
47.4% of the country’s religious population. The Roman Catholic Church is about 23.3%
of the population. The non-Protestant and non-Catholic groups constitute approximately
11.8% of the population. Most Muslims in Kenya are Sunn Muslims. Traditional religions
include the Kikuyu religion and the Mijikenda religion and there are also the Maasai,
Turkana, Samburu and Pokot tribes who adhere to traditional religions. The numbers of
Hindus in Kenya is small and only about 0.14% of the population. In our DHS sample,
there are three main religions which comprise 96.5% of household. The dominant religion is
Protestant (66.2%), followed by Catholic (27.8%) and Muslim (2.5%). 3.2% of households
report no religious faith. A religious breakdown of the ethnic groups show that most
Kikuyu are Christians, probably because they were the Kenyan tribe with the closest links
with Christian missions historically (Meck (1971): 27). Over 90% of Luhya and Luo are
Christians, compared to over 60% of Kamba. Some of the Mijikenda sub-groups, such as
the Digo, are Muslim. In Tables 8, 9, and 10 presented later in this paper, we examine the
influence of social interactions with respect to ethnicity, also controlling for the effects of
religion. As our results show later in the paper, despite these significant religious variations,
religion does not matter as much as ethnicity in these contexts. And we speculate that this
may largely be because the ethnic identities predate the advent of Christianity and Islam
in this society.
Region Ethnic boundaries in Kenya, to a very large extent, are coterminous with politi-
cal and administrative boundaries (Fapohunda and Poukouta (1997)). Today the regional
breakdown of the different ethnic groups is as follows: the Kalenjin reside in the Rift Val-
ley; the Kikuyu live in the Central region, but have also migrated to Nairobi and the Rift
Valley. The Meru/Embu reside in the North and East. The Luhya live in the Western
province, but have also migrated to Nairobi and Mombasa. The Luo live in Nyanza, with
Kisumu as their capital, but have also migrated to the Rift Valley. The Kamba live in close
proximity to Nairobi and exhibit ethnic affiliation to the Kikuyu. The Mijikenda/Swahili
live in the Coast province. The Meru and Embu groups neighbour the Kikuyu to the north
and east. An early study suggets that the Luhya, who live in Kenya’s Western province,
are a less homogenous group compared to the Kikuyu and Kamba (Were (1967)). Among
the Luhya, there is a distinction that needs to be made between those in the north and
those in areas such as Kakamega, with high population density. Although the Luo who live
in Nyanza depict a rate of population growth almost as high as the Luhya, they are a more
urbanised people (Ominde (1968)). For the Kamba, proximity to Nairobi and their close
ethnic affiliation to the Kikuyu are particularly significant (Berg-Schlosser (1984). The Mi-
jikenda and Swahili groups who reside in Kenya’s Coast province are the most agricultural
of all of Kenya ethnic groups.1
1The word ’Mijikenda’ means ’nine towns’ or ‘tribes’. The Mijikenda consist of nine distinct sub-groups
- Giriama, Duruma, Digo, Rabai, Chonyi, Kambe, Kauma, Ribe, and Jibana.
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Residential pattern of settlement One of the most notable features of these ethnic
groups is their pattern of residence.2 It is important to emphasise that the notion of the
’village’ in this society is rather more diffuse than in the compact settlements of Europe
and elsewhere. Although there are differences between ethnic groups, families are grouped
mainly in homesteads that are located in clusters, and which form the basis of community
interaction. In some of these clusters, for example, among the Kikuyu there exist groups of
households who are not merely coresident, but also related by blood and marriage. In other
clusters, there are households that are located in close proximity, but where individuals in
these households are not related to other individuals in neighbouring households.
For example, the Kalenjin live mainly in homesteads that are individual family based.
Property is usually inherited along paternal lines or male agnates. The smallest unit of
territorial composition in Kalenjin society is the ’temenik’ or hamlet, a cluster of home-
steads; these are usually grouped into ’villages’ of 15 to 60 temenik. The Kikuyu live in
homesteads on land owned by the family, and surrounded by fields (or ’shamba’). Tradi-
tionally land was owned by many households which constitute the extended family located
on the same ’ridge’ which is the traditional geographical division3 (Berg-Schlosser (1984):
50). Supplementing the organisation of Kikuyu society based on kinship, there is also a ge-
ographical demarcation. The ’itura’ or village consists of groups of families. This is further
subdivided into those living on the same ridge. The pattern of Luo settlement is similar
to other communities, although their homesteads usually consist of families who own land,
dispersed as a safeguard against climatic conditions. The Kamba are also agriculturists,
and their pattern of settlement is similar to the Kikuyu (Middleton and Kershaw (1965)).
The traditional land-owning unit is the extended family. In terms of territorial residence,
the most basic unit is the ukambani, which is a homestead that comprises several extended
families. Several of these are grouped to form a kivalo within which social interactions,
especially marriage, take place. For the Mijikenda, the main form of residence is the mudzi
or village which consists of groups of agriculturists and fisherman.
Clan organisation These tribal groups are also broadly characterised by three main
features that have relevance for social interactions: the importance of the family group, the
clan, and the system of age-grading4 (Meck (1971)). For example, anthropological studies
of the agriculturalist Kikuyu argue that among them, fathers exert a less important role for
economic decision-making, that relations between the extended family are strong, and that
they exhibit a highly evolved sense of ethnic identity which can often override more national
concerns (Berg-Schlosser (1984), Ferguson and SrungBoonmee (2003)). Anthropologists
comment that among the Kikuyu, the most economically and socially effective unit is the
mbari : ’a group of families who trace their descent from a common ancestor following
2A key point to note here is that villages are not defined units of settlement, although their boundaries
are well-known locally. These boundaries are usually marked by trees, stones, and so forth (Berg-Schlosser
(1984): 139)
3This was altered with the land reforms of 1950 when ownership of land was transferred to individuals.
4The system of age-grading is a form of vertical stratification which every member of a tribe goes through
during the course of their lives, with each ’age-grade’ made distinct from the other with certain rites of
passage (Kenyatta (1961):2; Berg-Schlosser (1984): 55).
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the paternal line, often for up to seven or eight generations. In addition to its functions
as the most important traditional land-holding unit in Kikuyu society, the mbari is an
important social reference-group for many Kikuyu and still plays an effective role in many
economic and social relationships including the more modern ones.’ (Berg-Schlosser (1984):
53). We would therefore expect that the endogenous social interaction effects among this
group would emerge as being particularly strong. The Luhya do not have as powerful a clan
organisation as some of the other groups (Meck (1971): 28). Anthropologists comment that
a feature of the Luhya that makes them quite distinct from other groups is the relatively
strict accepted norms of behaviour, particularly with respect to marriage and interactions
between the sexes (Berg-Schlosser (1984): 114).
Polygyny One of the interesting features of African societies including Kenya is the inci-
dence of polygyny. Polygyny can have two impacts on fertility: first, it can increase fertility
if there is more help provided with child-care, creating a micro-level externality within the
extended family household. Second, if there is greater discussion of family planning issues,
then this might work to reduce fertility. Alternatively if high-fertility norms are espoused
within the extended household then the effect might be to increase fertility.A number of
recent studies have examined the role of polygynous marriage norms in influencing demo-
graphic behaviour Hogan and Biratu (2004). There are 30% of polygynous households in
the Kenya DHS sample that we consider in this study, so these were households that had
more than one wife living in the household. This is not related to the household’s religious
affiliation. The rationale for looking at polygyny is that if other household members help
with child care, or indeed as with other African societies where ’fosterage’ is common,
other residents have an important bearing on a woman’s total fertility.A number of other
demographic studies of poor societies (see, for example, Iyer (2002)) have found that the
role played by residents within the household or within close proximity, such as friends and
neighbours, is important for fertility. We acknowledge that the effects of polygyny might
be even more complex than this. For example, unobserved differences among women who
enter polygynist unions might be correlated with unobservables in the fertility equation.
In general, the frequency of polygynous unions vary a great deal across Africa: DHS data
show that they are between 30-50% in West Africa, 20-35% in East Africa, and less than
20% in Southern Africa. So our sample which has 30% polygynous unions, is typical of
East Africa where Kenya is situated geographically.
Mortality Infant mortality and mortality caused by HIV/AIDS also would affect fertility
rates. We examine infant mortality and the awareness of HIV/AIDS in the population.
which are included in order to control for the fact that across all ethnic groups in Kenya,
as like other countries in Africa, there have been a large increase in HIV-related deaths
which might also affect fertility. For example, recent data show that 7.1-8.5% of adults aged
15-49 in Kenya are currently living with AIDS. Higher AIDS-related deaths may increase
fertility if many children are lost to this. There is also the possibiility of reverse causality
in that low CEB groups may use contraceptive methods more and hence this is a cause of
their low HIV rates as well. It is also important to examine infant mortality by ethnicity
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in Kenya. This is because demographers think that higher infant and child mortality is
frequently associated with higher fertility rates if parents want to replace children who
are lost to child death, or if they perceive that the average mortality rate in their region
is high. So it is important to control for mortality changes which might also influence
fertility in this country. As regards differences in mortality by ethnic groups in Kenya,
Tabutin and Akoto (1992) found that the probability of infant mortality among the Luo
was higher than among the Kikuyu. Brockerhoff and Hewett (2000) argue that in Kenya
mortality differentials by ethnic group exist and are related to several factors. Migratory
patterns influence the spread of disease, and economic and other conditions.For example,
they contrast the Kalenjin who are more sedentary with the Luhya who migrate more and
are hence more prone to exposure to infectious diseases. They also highlight the Kikuyu who
have better access to health and education which meant that they first experienced initially
at least the highest declines in mortality of any ethnic group in Kenya. For this reason,
the Kikuyu also had very low child mortality (the under-5 mortality rate for Kikuyus was
36.1 per 1000 live births in 1989-1993), but for non-Kikuyu groups, this was 125.1 deaths
per 1000 live births. They attribute this to resource concentration, and high altitude that
prevents the spread of malaria among Kikuyu children relative to other groups.
Education Initiated first by Jomo Kenyatta, education policy in Kenya has been pursued
actively by the government, with remarkable success, especially with increases in primary
and secondary school enrolment for girls. However, despite the general increases in the up-
take of education and policies such as school fee remission and the development of harambee
or self-help community schools which foster these, the mean number of years of schooling
differs considerably by ethnicity.
The mean number of years of education varies considerably by ethnic group in Kenya,
as shown in Table 3. This factor has relevance for social interactions as we might expect
the importance of social interactions on fertility to be mediated by the effect of education.
Previous studies of Kenyan fertility argue that the Kikuyu and the Kamba show the least
preference for large families because they had early access to colonial education (Fapohunda
and Poukouta (1997)). The Kikuyu are the best educated, compared to other ethnic groups
in Kenya (Berg-Schlosser (1984): 60; De Wilde (1967): 39). We can explain this develop-
ment historically - many Kikuyu worked as wage labourers in European-owned plantations
and attended schools. As a community, they viewed education as the means to progress
and this led them to acquire positions of responsibility in the colonial administration. In
the post-Independence period, the Kikuyu continued to dominate and consolidate their
position, politically and economically, relative to the other groups (Ferguson and Srung-
Boonmee (2003)). The Luhya populations, are also highly literate groups. Most Kamba
are enrolled in formal schooling. Among the Kalenjin, levels of education are, in general,
less than other groups. The Mijikenda and Swahili groups also have low levels of education
compared to other groups in this population.
Politics of ethnicity Events in Kenya in 2007-2008 highlighted the importance of the
politics of ethnicity in this country. Differences in the economic performance of ethnic
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groups can be traced to their evolution in Kenyan history and to economic decisions made
by these groups (Ferguson and SrungBoonmee (2003)). Ethnic identity in Kenya has al-
ways been very strong historically, and it continues to be a very potent force in Kenya’s
politics even today. For example, the Kalenjin, who are a heterogenous ethnic group and
who live primarily in Kenya’s Rift Valley province (Were (1967)) are closest to Nairobi
geographically, and they are politically and economically Kenya’s dominant ethnic group
(Kenyatta (1966)). Their location in the eastern Rift Valley allows them to enjoy a level
of political proximity that, in part, determines their (relatively) superior economic status.
Agricultural innovation first arose among the Kikuyu who also absorbed land reform more
readily than other groups (Meck (1971): 27). Historically, the Kikuyu were one of the first
ethnic groups in Kenya to absorb European-style capitalism in the form of wage labour and
participation in the monetary economy, so in contrast for example to the Maasai whom
they neighbour, the Kikuyu’s subsequent economic performance has been much better (Fer-
guson and SrungBoonmee (2003)). 5 In the past the Luo were less responsive to social and
economic change compared to other tribes (Meck (1971)). For example, land reform met
with a great deal of resistance among this group as it was believed to conflict with religious
beliefs. But since 2001, the Luo have increasingly been incorporated into the government.
In more recent times, relations between the ethnic groups has been closely tied with the
development of Kenyan politics, particularly since the introduction of multiparty politics
in Kenya since 1991 after over twenty years of rule by one party (Throup (2001)). The in-
creased strength and importance of ethnic identity has also led, more worryingly, to ethnic
clashes in 1992-93, 1997 and 2007-2008.
3 Social Interactions and Fertility: Theory, Measurement
and Estimation
3.1 Theory
The conventional economic household demand model of fertility behaviour posits that a
couple’s fertility is a function of the money costs of children and the opportunity costs
of the value of parental time (Becker (1981)). The standard Beckerian atomistic utility
function ( Becker (1981), Willis (1973)) is given by
Ui = U(ci, zi,xi, εi), (1)
where Ui denotes the utility function of household i, ci represents the number of children, zi
is all sources of satisfaction to the husband and wife other than those arising from children,
and xi denotes the vector of socio-demographic characteristics which affect preferences.
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5For example, following the Land Transfer Programme, Kikuyu land owners in the Central province
specialised in the production of coffee which is widely exported by Kenya, earning these farmers resources
that ensured their success as a community (Ferguson and SrungBoonmee (2003)).
6Note that within the household we consider husband’s and wife’s preferences to be coincident. In this
respect we do not examine intra-household bargaining between the couple in the determination of fertility
outcomes. For theoretical simplicity, we assume that the ’household’ represents the couple. Empirically this
can be translated into a measure of the woman’s fertility, measured by the total number of children borne
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εi allows for imperfect information on the part of the analyst. This is subject to the usual
budget constraint
Ii = cipc + zipz, (2)
where we assume that total income Ii is expended on children ci and on all sources of
satisfaction other than those arising from children, zi; pc and pz are the shadow prices of
children and other sources of satisfaction respectively.
The extension of the atomistic utility model to incorporate social interactions allows
us to capture that component of individual utility attributable to a fertility choice ci, that
is dependent upon the fertility choices of others (see, for example, Becker and Murphy
(2000)). The ’others’ in question may be those resident in the individual’s household or in
the local community; for example, in the individual’s street or neighbourhood.
It is important to distinguish between local and global interactions as individual be-
haviour may be determined by the decisions of a larger ethnic group. In a local interaction,
individuals have incentives to conform to the behaviour of a small number of appropriately
defined neighbours, whose actions they can ’observe’. In contrast a global interaction is
where individuals face incentives to conform to the ’expected’ behaviour of a common ref-
erence group (Horst and Scheinkman (2003b)), whose behaviour we cannot observe. It is
possible that these expectations are channelled through the media, or through other norms
of behaviour such as knowledge of the customs and traditions of particular ethnicities.
There is thus the possibility of multiple social interactions - namely that social interaction
is both localised within a specific location, and more diffuse across a larger, geographically
diffuse sub-population.
Following Manski (1993), three hypotheses are advanced to explain why individuals
belonging to a common reference group behave similarly.7 In a fertility context, there is
an endogenous effect if, ceteris paribus, children ever born (ceb) to a woman varies with
the average ceb of members of her ethnic group or locality, perhaps because she suffers a
utility loss from deviations from group behaviour.
There is an exogenous or contextual effect if, ceteris paribus, ceb to a woman varies
with the average characteristics of her ethnic group or locality. For example, the existence
of educated neighbours may foster positive attitudes towards smaller family size.
Education exercises a prominent effect on fertility behaviour. For example, individual
educational attainment affects individual-level fertility. In a developing society, this would
be dependent on the money-costs of acquiring an education and the opportunity costs of
wages foregone. There is also an iconic value of education as individuals may aspire to the
attributes of other higher educated groups in a population. In some developing societies,
the iconic value of an education is very high. For example, sociologists of India comment on
the phenomenon of ’Sanskritization’ in which lower-caste groups take on the characteristics
and customs of the upper castes in order to gain greater legitimacy and status in the Indian
social system. Frequently this manifests itself in the desire to acquire an education, or to
by her.
7For an excellent discussion of the theoretical literature on economic models of social interactions and
the influence of non-market institutions on market institutions see Glaeser and Scheinkman (1999)).
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continue one (Srinivas (1994)).
Finally, there is a correlated effect if, ceteris paribus, women in the same ethnic group
or locality have similar ceb because they are, for example, similarly wealthy.
The importance of differentiating between these three hypotheses can be seen by exam-
ining their respective policy implications. Consider, for example, an intervention to provide
free contraception to some members of an ethnic group or a number of neighbourhoods. If
there are endogenous effects, then an effective policy of free contraception may both directly
reduce the fertility of the recipients but, as their fertility decreases, indirectly reduces the
fertility of all other members of that ethnic group or neighbourhood. Exogenous effects
and correlated effects will not, in general, generate this kind of social multiplier effect.
3.2 Measurement
As outlined in Section 2, using a number of anthropological sources we have identified
that within rural populations in Kenya, fertility decisions are conducted within families
which are members of ethnic groups and/or religious groups, and which reside mainly in
homesteads that are located in relatively small clusters. We postulate that these allegiances,
form the basis of social interactions. We focus upon the role of two reference groups. First,
an ethnicity effect derives from the fact that the status of women and attitudes towards
children differ across ethnic groups, with differential evaluation of the psychological costs
and benefits of bearing children.8
Second, in the case of Kenya, situated between the individual and the ethnic group,
are small clusters of households within which physical proximity dictates that individuals
directly observe and bear the costs of the decisions of others. The clusters are homogenous
in that they usually consist of the same ethnic (and/or religious) group. In addition we
have information which allows us to distinguish between clusters which, for certain ethnic
groups, are comprised of households which are blood related, with obvious ramifications
for interactions.9 For example, in the case of the Kikuyu we might expect the extent
of such interaction to be on average higher given that clusters of households are generally
comprised of groups of individuals which are related by blood and marriage (the mbari). In
such a situation one might expect to find a stronger normative influence relative to clusters
comprised of households, as in the case of the Kalenjin, who live mainly in homesteads that
are individual family based.
3.3 Estimation
In motivating a modelling strategy we first consider the observed data. For each ith woman
we observe {ci,xi, Lij}, where ci represents a count of the total number of children ever
born, xi is a vector which includes individual characteristics, together with ethnic, cluster,
and household attributes; Lij , j = 1, ..., J denotes the j
th location in which i resides.
8There has been a great deal of research on the effects on fertility of religion and ethnic group membership
(see Iyer (2002) for a detailed discussion of this literature).
9In other contexts the locus of interaction might consist of a well-defined set of households who live
within a given geographical space such as a street (see, for example, Guinnane, Moehling, and O’Grada
(2001)).
11
Our sample, restricted to women between 30 and 49 years of age, is designed to capture
the decision-making of women who have completed their fertility, thereby excluding rela-
tively young women for whom timing effects may be confounded with changes in fertility.
The presence of timing effects, for example younger cohorts marrying at later ages, are
important in that they determine, in part, the difference between the observed number of
children for a given woman and the mean number of children in the appropriate reference
group. This is central to our thesis, namely that changes in this difference will impact upon
ceb due to an interaction effect.
Dynamic models of fertility consider birth spacing, birth timing, the influence of uncer-
tainty, and essentially view fertility decisions sequentially (for a more recent example see
Iyer and Velu 2006). Seminal dynamic models of fertility such as Wolpin (1984), Newman
(1988) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) address questions such as the importance of
birth timing and spacing. The Wolpin model examines birth spacing, birth timing, and
intertemporal tradeoffs. In this model an individual maximises the expected value of the
discounted sum of period utility over their lifetime by choosing a sequence of births and
consumption, subject to infant mortality and shocks to household income.
3.3.1 Model Specification
In this section we consider the specification of the conditional mean, and in particular the
specification of the exogenous and endogenous components of fertility behaviour.
Given that count data is both integer valued and heteroscedastic by construction, the
Poisson density represents a natural benchmark to model count data. However, the equidis-
persion property, namely that the conditional mean is equal to the conditional variance, is
generally restrictive. In this paper we utilise the Generalised Method of Moments (gmm)
estimator. A gmm estimator10 is particularly suited given that it allows for unobserved
heterogeneity without a full set of parametric assumptions, and readily accommodates
endogenous regressors.
We write the conditional mean as
E(ci|xi, ωi) = exp( cfi,gδ + edgγ + h′iθ + p′gκ+ q′iη + ωi ). (3)
ci denotes the number of children (ceb) ever born to the i
th woman. (3) includes the stan-
dard set of individual (qi), household (hi), and cluster (pg) characteristics, with associated
vectors of parameters η, θ, and κ. cfig represents conformist interaction effects attributable
to the fertility choices of other women in the same group. edg denotes exogenous interaction
effects due to education which we measure by the mean level of education in the cluster
resided by the individual. δ and γ are the associated scalar parameters.
Exogenous Interaction Effects
We represent exogenous effects attributable to the education of other women in the same
cluster using edg = N
−1
g
∑
i∈g
edi with edi denoting the education level of the i
th woman re-
siding in the same cluster. It is argued that the effect of education is iconic, with some
10See Appendix I for for further details.
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individuals aspiring to the attributes of other higher educated members within their cluster.
We choose to model these education interactions at the level of the cluster as higher edu-
cated women in the locality may be leaders and opinion-makers who influence others who
are less educated to adopt low fertility norms. Here we consider the proportion of women
in the cluster who had completed higher education as representative of this exogenous
education effect on fertility.
Endogenous Interaction Effects
We extend the standard atomistic utility model of fertility to capture that component
of individual utility attributable to a fertility choice that is dependent upon the fertility
choices of others. Individuals may have incentives to conform to the behaviour of a small
number of appropriately defined neighbours whose attributes they can ’observe’.
In the conditional mean specification (3) endogenous conformist effects are represented
by cfg = Ei(cg − ci), where ci denotes the number of children (ceb) ever born to the ith
woman, and Ei(cg) is the subjective expectation of mean ceb held by the i
th woman resident
in cluster g.11 Restricting the sample to those women aged 30-449 and thereby confining our
analysis to completed lifetimes, circumvents the problem of pooling data over age cohorts.
For older women we can appeal to rational expectations and set the subjective expectation
of cohort fertility equal to the mean observed level of fertility, Ei(cg) = c¯g. However, this
becomes problematic when considering subjective expectations of younger women who are
not near the end of their reproductive careers.
In Appendix III we outline our identification strategy which explains how we isolate
the effect of social interactions from other determinants of fertility behaviour. We do this
by first outlining the identification problem in the linear-in-means social interaction model
as originally considered by Manski (1993), and more recently by Blume, Brock, Durlauf,
and Ioannides (2010) and Ioannides (2008). Since the question of identification is well
understood in the linear framework, this will provide a useful point of departure.
3.3.2 Household-level and Individual-level Controls
We control for a number of household and individual characteristics that we believe im-
pact fertility decisions to ensure that the endogenous and exogenous effects are robust to
variations in other characteristics.
Individual-Level Controls
Individual-level controls include the age of the woman measured in years and an age-
squared variable accounting for the non-linearity associated with age-related variables. The
education of the woman is included and measured as the highest level of education attained,
differentiating between primary, secondary, and higher education effects. The influence of
the media was measured as whether the woman listened to the radio at least once a week.
This variable was included on the assumption that greater information about contraceptive
technology would be available to the woman if she listened to the radio. Messages about
this are routinely broadcast on the national radio channel, the ’Voice of Kenya’ in English,
11See Appendix II for further discussion of conformist effects.
13
Swahili and the vernacular. We also include a variable here for whether the individual
knows a place to test for hiv/aids. This is to control for their awareness of aids, which
is an important contributor to mortality in Kenya and which therefore is likely to affect
fertility, as also discussed in Section 2.
We also include the following measures: age at first marriage, and knowledge of any
method of contraception. We expect that this will capture the extent to which the age at
first marriage is greater for younger relative to older women. With the success of recent
family planning programmes in Africa, knowledge of contraception is also likely to be
greater for younger women than older ones. We also control explicitly for religion of the
respondent.
Household-Level Controls
One notable problem with the dhs no direct questions on income were asked of survey
respondents. Utilising a series of questions asked about household quality, access to infras-
tructure, and the ownership of consumer durables, we constructed a number of indicators
which control for the economic status of households. The quality of roof construction was
measured by whether the household had a tiled roof or not. The quality of the floor was
measured by whether the household had a tiled or wood floor or not. The status of the
household was also proxied by ownership of consumer durables including whether or not
the household owns a radio, or a television.
Two other important household-level attributes that we utilised are (i) a measure of
infant mortality, and (ii) reported awareness of hiv/aids in the population. These factors
are included in order to control for the fact that Kenya has witnessed a large increase in
hiv-related deaths over the time period under study which might also affect fertility. And
that different religious groups might have different norms about contraception which can
again affect both ceb and ceb rates. The dhs data provide data on infant mortality but
because they do not have exact numbers for the hiv/aids-related deaths, we use reported
awareness of hiv/aids in the population for our measure of how pervasive this is likely to
be by region.
As discussed earlier, polygyny can have two impacts on fertility: first, it can increase
fertility if within polygynyst households provide more child-care, creating a micro-level
externality within the extended family household. Second, if there is greater discussion of
family planning issues, then this might work to reduce fertility. Alternatively if high-fertility
norms are espoused within the extended household then the effect might be to increase
fertility, again which might also be related to religion. There are 30% of households in the
Kenya sample which are polygynous, so these were households that had more than one wife
living in the household. We acknowledge that the effects of polygyny might be even more
complex than this. For example, the coefficients on all other estimated parameters may
vary by family structure. And unobserved differences among women who enter polygynist
unions might be correlated with unobservables in the fertility equation. But we prefer to
adopt a more parsimonious specification controlling for these effects. In order to do so, we
also control for the number of usual residents in the household as a proxy for polygynous
households.
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3.3.3 Cluster Attributes
We control for a number of attributes at the level of the cluster. Critical in this respect is
access to water and fuel infrastructure. Based upon the work of Dasgupta (2000), better
access to water and fuel reduces the demand for child labour to collect them, and that
this is turn reduces the demand for children, and hence the fertility rate (Iyer (2002)).
Access to fuel was measured by a mean-level effect for access to electricity. Access to water
infrastructure at the cluster-level was measured according to whether access to water was
piped into the residence or not. In addition, an additional cluster-level attribute included
was whether or not a radio was listened to at least once a week. This variable was estimated
at the cluster level by aggregating up whether or not an individual listened to a radio.
Finally since the process of interaction will depend upon the size of the group, we control
for the population size of the cluster
4 Data and characteristics of DHS survey
Our sample, taken from the Kenyan Demographic and Health Survey (kdhs)Ken (1999),
covers 88% of the population. The survey contains interview data for 7800 women aged
15-49. It contains women from all of Kenya’s large ethnic and religious groups and covers a
wide geographical area, omitting only the areas of extremely low population density in the
North. Geographically. Kenya is divided into 7 provinces which are further subdivided into
47 districts. The Kenya dhs covered 42 of Kenya’s districts; 35 were sampled, 7 were not.
17 districts were oversampled. The representation of each group in the sample is similar to
its representation in the whole population. The dhs data includes information on ethnic
groups, of which the six main groups are the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya, Luo, Kamba and
Kisii. The Kikuyu is the largest, with 17.9% of the population.12 In the data used in this
study we consider individual-level data only for the 5994 women residing in a rural cluster,
and who did respond. The largest number of women included in the sample live in the Rift
Valley region, while the smallest number of women sampled live in Nairobi.13
The Kenya dhs adopted a two-stage stratified sampling approach that selected house-
holds located within primary sampling units (psu) or sampling clusters. These clusters are
identical to the complete enumeration of sample clusters which took place as part of the
1977 National Demographic Survey. The sample points themselves are identical to those
chosen in the sampling frame maintained by the Kenyan Central Bureau of Statistics.
In the 35 of Kenya’s 42 districts that were included in the survey, there were 536
clusters - 444 rural clusters and 92 urban clusters, of which 530 were non-empty clusters.14
The location of the clusters geographically are identifiable within the district and province
(DHS and Macro International, 1999: 179-182). A complete list of all households in each
12The dhs sample excludes the Maasai, a pastoral group living in the Kenyan Rift Valley, and other tribes
such as the Galla and Somalis, who live in the north-east.
13No household from Nairobi were present in our estimation sample. We therefore exclude Nairobi from
the summary tables.
146 of the clusters could not be included in the survey due to inaccessibility (dhs and Macro International
1999: 180).
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cluster was recorded between November 1997 and February 1998. From the remaining 530
clusters, a systematic sample was drawn of, on average, 22 households in urban clusters
and 17 households in rural clusters. This formed a total of 9465 households. In these
households, all women age 15-49 were targeted for interview. Response rates varied by
province from approximately 88% to 99% (for more details see kdhs, 1998 p.180).
Table 1 presents the mean ceb by region and ethnicity. Average ceb varies from a low
of 2.58 in Central to a high of 3.9 in Nyanza. For a number of regions, including Nyanza
and Western we observe notable intra-regional variation in ceb by ethnicity.
According to the dhs data, a rural woman has on average about 5.2 children compared to
fertility among urban women at 3.1 children. Fertility differentials by the level of education
show that illiterate women bear on average 5.8 children compared to 3.5 children for women
with secondary school education (dhs 1998, p. xvii). The sample reveals demographic
differences between ethnic groups: for women aged 40-49, the mean ceb varies from 5.91
for Kikuyu to 7.56 for Luo. As shown in Table 1, the differences in fertility by ethnic group
are clearly very large.
Our sample also records the religion of the household. There are three main religions
which comprise 96.5% of household. The dominant religion is Protestant (66.2%), followed
by Catholic (27.8%) and Muslim (2.5%). 3.2% of households report no religious faith.15
Table 2 presents the mean ceb by region and religion. The data reveal variation in mean
ceb induced by the combination of religious and regional effects.
The dhs data show that knowledge of family planning in Kenya is very high: 98% of
women and 99% of men were able to name at least one modern method of contraception.
There are 38% of women who use contraception and the most widely used methods are
contraceptive injectables, the pill, female sterilization and periodic abstinence. Contra-
ceptive use does however vary greatly by region: while there are 57% of women in the
Central province who use contraception, only 24% of women in the Coast province do so
likewise. Only 23% of women with no education use contraception compared to 57% of
women with secondary education. Both government and private medical sources provide
access to contraceptives.
We also observe some variation by religion. 38% of Christian and 39% and Catholic
women use contraception, with the number falling to 27% for Muslim women and 39%
forthose who had no religion.
Table 3 presents mean years of education by region and ethnicity. The mean years of
education are highest for the Kikuyu at 8.1 years while the lowest at 4.2 years is among
the Mijikenda/Swahili groups. Table 4 presents the distribution of total children ever born
in the sample. The main range of total children ever born is between 0 and 8 children in
this sample.
15For a relatively small number of households the religious affiliation is not reported.
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5 Metereological Data as an Instrument for Fertility
In this section we present a justification for the use of the rainfall instruments. In Section
5.1 discuss how the instruments were constructed.
We contend that for tropical countries like Kenya which experience hot weather and
exhibit less fertility control than in developed countries, properties of the distribution
of rainfall, and in particular the mean and variance, represent valid instruments for the
observed variation in fertility.
The use of rainfall data as an instrument is based on a number of arguments. First,
in low-income countries in which fertility regulation is not practiced extensively, and in
which parents calculate the costs and benefits of having an additional child based on income
(Becker (1981)), rainfall variations will influence fertility behaviour. For example, in periods
of drought when income is likely to be low, parents might postpone childbearing (Lam and
Miron (1996)).
Second, high temperatures will have an effect on conception and thereby on fertility. In
the main, since the Kenyan ethnic groups tend to reside in distinct regions then geographic
variation in rainfall is likely to explain variation in fertility rates by ethnicity.
In addition to the impact of mean rainfall, we argue that the seasonality of rainfall
exerts an additional independent effect on fertility decisions, and as such represents an
additional instrument. The argument for the use of this instrument is based on the notion
that seasonality of rainfall proxies uncertainty. Recent papers in economic demography
have also been examining the impact of uncertainty and the real options approach in order
to understand decision-making about fertility (see, for example, Iyer and Velu (2006);
Bhaumik and Nugent (2010) The impact of uncertainty on fertility can be either positive
or negative. If parents view children as an ’investment’ good then a decrease in uncertainty
can reduce the insurance value of having children and thus decrease the net benefit of having
children (Iyer and Velu (2006)). Alternately, if children or ’child services’ are viewed purely
as a ’consumption’ good, then a decrease in uncertainty is likely to result in an increase in
fertility as the desired number of children rises.
Combining these arguments, we note that in areas of abundant rainfall, which are on
average cooler and have lower temperatures, we expect a priori that these areas will also
be areas of higher fertility. This is because in areas of abundant rainfall, income will be
high. Areas that are very arid and receive on average very poor rainfall are also likely
to be those with very high hot weather temperatures, and will exhibit lower fertility as
conception rates are likely to be low. We would therefore expect to observe higher fertility
in better rainfall-fed districts of Kenya as compared to those which have lower rainfall and
greater seasonality of rainfall as well.
5.1 Constructing the rainfall instruments
In this study we use unique historical meteorological data on monthly rainfall collected
for us by the Kenyan Meteorological Department from thirty-one meteorological stations
in Kenya at 5-year intervals, from 1930 to 2000. This data was aggregated into yearly
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average rainfall and its standard deviation by rainfall station in each Kenyan district. In
considering how we construct our instruments it is important to consider the nature of the
model. Given that we are using a static model of completed fertility, then in addressing
the problem of endogeneity it makes sense to instrument the conformist endogenous effects
with accumulated lifetime rainfall. In terms of the impact of rainfall on fertility behaviour,
a given household is likely to make fertility decisions (i.e. the number and timing of
children) which reflect both the geographic and temporal distribution of rainfall. However,
in specifying a one period static model of completed fertility, requires that we align total
fertility with total rainfall faced over the lifetime and construct instruments accordingly.
Below we outline the matching exercise that allowed us to assign to each woman the
total rainfall faced over her reproductive lifetime i.e. during her childbearing years. The
matching of the metereological and the dhs data proceeded by assigning, for each observa-
tion in a particular district, rainfall data which minimised the Euclidean distance between
the district capital and the nearest metereological station. 16
To quantify the impact of uncertainty on fertility, we construct an index for the season-
ality of rainfall across the meteorological stations in Kenya over the course of a year. For
each year the index takes the difference between the average rainfall in the wettest and the
driest three months, and scales them by the average rainfall for the year for that partic-
ular meteorological station (see Foeken (1994)). This is reported as the index of District
Rainfall Seasonality (drs).
Table 5 depicts the geographical variations in rainfall across the different provinces
of Kenya. Rainfall is highest on the western coast of Kenya (the Western province and
Nyanza) in which fertility rates are also the highest (3.2 and 3.3). As shown in Table
6, rainfall in Kenya is highly seasonal and varies considerably by geographical region. We
examine correlations between the total number of children ever born and the average rainfall
by district in Kenya. This correlation is positive and is 0.437. For women who have 10
births or fewer, this correlation was even stronger at 0.4598. Table 7 shows for the year
1998 children ever born by province, mean rainfall and rainfall seasonality for the different
Kenyan regions.
Looking at Tables 5, 6 and 7 collectively, suggests that lower rainfall seasonality might be
associated with higher fertility: the greatest seasonality of rainfall is in the Central province
and the eastern province, the regions that also have the lowest fertility. Of course these
findings could also be driven by other characteristics of these provinces such as income
or education, and in the models presented below we examine the effect of our rainfall
instrument after controlling for some of these other factors. However, if we look simply
at the correlations between these rainfall patterns and fertility rates across the different
provinces of Kenya, it would appear that the areas with the highest rainfall, and lowest
rainfall seasonality, are also those in Kenya which show the highest fertility.
16We used latitude and longitude data for the district capitals and those of the meteorological stations.
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6 Results
We present our main results in Tables 8 9 and 10 for ethnic, religion and interaction effects
respectively. We do not report results for the individual, household or cluster level effects in
detail in these tables but these are included in all estimations presented, and also discussed
below.
For each variable we report three outputs. Parameter estimates, say βj , may be inter-
preted as the proportional change in the number of children ever born due to a unit change
in the jth regressor.17 Underneath and in parenthesis we report the p-value, followed by
the eβ̂j , the factor change (the incidence-rate ratio (irr) in the expected count for a unit
increase in a given xj . As an example, a irr = 1.10 indicates a 10% increase in the ex-
pected ceb for a one unit change in xj . We emphasise this statistic when interpreting our
results. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary intra-cluster correlation. We also report
the J-statistic affording a test of the exogeneity of our instruments. In Table 8 we report
the results for our baseline model with ethnic effects. Table 9 reports our results when we
include a set of a religion dummies, replacing ethnic effects. Table 10 reports our results,
when we include both religious and ethnic effects.
Ethnicity and Religion Effects
Table 8 reports our results for the baseline model. Each table presents results for three spec-
ifications. Specification I incorporates traditional fertility determinants at the individual,
household and ethnicity level. Specification II extends I with the addition of ethnic-level
exogenous effects (due to education), with specification III adding ethnic-level conformist
effects.
Ethnicity effects were significant for all ethnic groups such as the Kalenjin (1.221), the
Luhya (1.272), the Kisii (1.154) and for the Luo (1.321), revealing larger fertility effects
relative to the Kikuyu which are the reference group. The relative magnitudes of the ethnic
effects reflect what the descriptive statistics also show in Table 1 namely that the Kikuyu
have the lowest fertility of any of the ethnic groups. Given that in many cases ethnic groups
settle in specific regions, it was not possible to separately identify all regional effects.
In Table 9 when we replace ethnicity with religion, the only group for which the effect
is significant is for the group with no religion (1.120). In Table 10 when we include both
ethnicity and religion, the effects are significant for the ethnici groups Kalenjin (1.216),
Luhya (1.270) and Luo (1.323) only, and not significant for any of the religious groups.
Ethnic-Level Education Effects
We consider exogenous education effects as attributable to the effect of observing the level of
education of other women in the same cluster. We measure this effect using the proportion
17This follows since
∂E(c|x)
∂xj
= βj exp(x
′β)
where E(c|x) = exp(x′β).
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of women who had completed higher education, allowing parameters to differ by ethnicity
and the age of the woman.18
With the exception of the Luhya ethnic group, ethnic-Level education effects in Table
8 are insignificant after controlling for individual educational attainment. They are also
unimportant in Table 9 when we substitute religion for ethnicity, and they are only sig-
nificant for the Luhya group (0.386) when we include both ethnicity and religion in Table
10.
Ethnic-Level Conformist effects
In Table 8 the localised endogenous effects emanating from within the village cluster, are
captured by a parameter which, for each ethnic group reflects the impact of the difference
between a cluster mean-level fertility and individual ceb - namely the difference between
a mean-level and individual ceb for women who live in the same cluster. We observe that
for all 6 groups these parameters are significant and positive with effects being strongest
for the Kikuyu, ranging from 1.267 for the Kikuyu, 1.247 for the Kamba, 1.209 for the
Kalenjin, 1.196 for the Luhya, 1.172 for the Kisii, to 1.131 for the Luo.
We emphasise that these results are consistent with our anthropological understanding
of the ethnic groups (as discussed in Section 2). Namely, for those clusters in which individ-
uals were related both by blood and marriage, as for example, among the Kikuyu mbari, the
endogenous effects on fertility are the strongest of the ethnic group effects. This is impor-
tant for demographic analyses per se since our results indicate the importance for fertility
of including a measure which captures the effects of interactions within ethnic groups, and
that they are important over and above individual and household characteristics. This is
consistent with anthropological and other studies of fertility outlined in Section 2 which
also emphasise the role of these social norms. It is also striking that the Kikuyu who
demonstrate the lowest average fertility are also those for whom the endogenous effects are
the strongest.
In Table 9 we report a model which is identical except we allow for religious effects
but exclude ethnicity effects. Using the Christian religion as a reference category, we find
that none of the religious effects are significant. The only group for which conformist
effects matter are the Kikuyu (1.135). We note that this model fails Hansen’s test of
overidentifying restrictions
In Table 10 we report results for a model specification where we allow for religious effects
in addition to the role of ethnicity. We again find that religion does not exert any significant
incremental effect on the number of children ever born. Comparing the results in Table
10 and 8, we find that the results do not change to any significant degree. For example,
in Table 9 with religion, the endogenous effects are all insignificant except for the Kikuyu,
while in Table 10 with religion controlled for and ethnicity effects, the endogenous effects for
ethnicity are all highly significant. This suggets that the ethnicity social interaction effects
18For the Kamba ethnic group the numbers of women who had completed higher education was ex-
tremely small across most clusters, and as a result, the exogenous education effect was constructed using
the proportion who had completed a secondary school education.
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which we postulate as being important in this society are upheld even after controlling for
the effect of religion.
In Kenya there is a fair amount of heterogeneity by religion. However, the question is
how this potential effect of religion plays out alongside the generalized norms at the level
of the ethnic group, which are much stronger in this society. We speculate that one reason
why there may not be an effect of religion is that the tribal groups and tribal norms pre-date
the introduction of Christianity and Islam in this society, and may also be associated with
historical tribal religions, so this might be one reason why the ethnic effects predominate
the religion effects. Hence, we maintain the emphasis on ethnicity and the different channels
of effects, even after controlling for religion.
Individual-level effects
We do not report the details of the individual and household-level effects in Tables 8, 9
and 10 but discuss them here. As expected many of the individual-level variables were
highly significant: these included the woman’s age with an older woman exhibiting higher
fertility compared to her younger counterpart. For women, primary and secondary ed-
ucation were significant and positive. Higher education was significant in specification I
and as expected, strongly negative.19 Primary and secondary education has the expected
positive relationship with ceb. Also in specifications I and II, if the woman knows a place
to test for aids, she was likely to have much lower fertility than if she did not. This effect
however disappears when the endogenous effects are included. We control for the effect of
an individual’s religion, but do not see any effects for this, except for those with no religion
in Table 9, and these effects disappear entirely when the ethnicity effects are included in
Table 10.
Timing Effects
In order to examine the fertility behavior of a group of women whose fertility is largely
complete we restrict the sample to women aged 30-49. We also control for age at first
marriage, and knowledge of any method of contraception. Age at marriage exerts a strongly
negative effect on fertility. Knowledge of contraception was not significant.
Household-level effects
Household-level controls are included so as to reduce the possibility that any inference on
household-level interaction effects is not confounded by household-level omitted variables At
the household level we make a distinction between interactions within the household which
may have implications for fertility, and household-level controls. None of the household-level
interaction effects were significant, except the infant mortality variable at the household
level in specifications I and II. The significance of the infant mortality variable which
measured whether a son or a daughter had died, is consistent with the argument that
higher infant mortality usually results in higher fertility as well. Interestingly, when the
19The base category was women with no education.
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endogenous effects are included, the significance of this variable disappeared. This might
suggest that there are ethnic variations in infant mortality rates, as discussed further below.
In general we would expect that income would be negatively correlated with fertility.
As noted above, one of the problems with the dhs survey is that no direct questions on
income were asked of survey respondents. To address this deficiency a number of household
level variables were included as controls for income and other characteristics. One measure
of roofing quality was included to suggest that if the woman lived in a household that was
wealthier, as measured by a better quality roof such as a tiled roof, then her CEB was
more likely to be lower, relatively to the base category - a thatched roof. If a woman lived
in a house which had a tiled floor, the expected number of children ever born was likely
to be lower than if she was resident in a house with a sand floor. The tiled floor variable
emerged as very significant. For the roofing quality variables, if the woman lived in a house
which had a tiled roof (relative to the base of thatch), then this might have been important
but this was not as significant as floor quality. Two variables included in the models
which could be construed both as income indicators and as controls for media access are
radio and television ownership. Television ownership was strongly negatively significant in
specifications I and II, but not radio ownership, in the models with no endogenous effects.
7 Conclusion
Strategic complementarities in fertility decisions implies that a couple’s fertility decisions
may be dependent on the actions of others in the vicinity or in the society more widely. The
mechanisms through which these complementarities occur are through social interactions.
This paper has examined social interactions in the context of fertility behaviour in Kenya.
We have examined the role of dependencies across individuals that reside in a cluster
of households and who locate according to ethnicity. More significantly, we emphasise
the existence of multiple channels of social interaction. Our results confirm strongly the
importance of ethnic-level effects alongside the traditional determinants of fertility at the
individual leve such as religionl. After controlling for the timing effects, endogenous effects,
household and individual effects, the exogenous effects are insignificant. This might suggest
that social interactions matter more at the level of the extended group - in this instance
localised interactions through village clusters and more global interactions through ethnic
effects. We do not find any significant effects of religion. In the context of a wider debate
about multiple identities, this seems to suggest that the effects of ethnicity may outweigh
the effects of religion in this society.
Given their significance as our results show, we feel that more research needs to be done
on these effects and the broader relationship between demography and cultural networks
such as ethnicity and religion. Our results suggest that in considering a continuum of in-
teractions from the most local i.e. the individual to the most global, the ethnic group, kin
groups and the structure of the network of womens’ interactions may be more important
to fertility decision-making than interactions that take place at the level of the household.
This could well be a function of how attitudes and norms related to high fertility might
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be changing. For example, as women are better informed about matters related to fer-
tility decision-making beyond their immediate household, whether through the media or
through other channels, this knowledge influences norms and exerts greater influence on
their decision-making. Our research is of course unable to solve this puzzle precisely be-
cause data on networks was not collected in the Kenya DHS survey, but it does suggest
that more research is required to identify the precise form of the interactions operating
among kin groups, religious and ethnic groups, and how they affect fertility preferences in
Kenya and elsewhere, where ethnicity, religion and fertility outcomes are linked.
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Table 1: Children Ever Born By Region and Ethnicity
Region
Ethnicity
Central Coast Eastern Nyanza Rift Valley Western µEceb Nsample
Kalenjin 8.00 9.00 0.50 6.33 3.34 2.93 3.34 1277
Kamba 3.71 3.41 2.88 4.00 3.80 - 2.93 674
Kikuyu 2.56 3.14 2.50 3.00 3.22 7.50 2.74 958
Kissi 1.67 - - 2.81 2.65 8.50 2.81 557
Luhya 2.29 3.67 3.00 4.23 3.48 3.36 3.40 913
Luo 2.67 1.00 3.93 3.08 3.30 3.84 741
Meru/Embu 3.60 0.00 2.96 2.00 1.00 - 2.94 444
Miji/Swa - 3.43 1.50 - - 1.00 3.41 425
µEceb 2.58 3.41 2.90 3.49 3.31 3.36 3.19
Nsample 728 465 1078 1208 1727 783 5994
µEceb (µ
R
ceb) denote, respectively, mean of ceb by Ethnicity (Region)
− denotes a zero sample count.
Table 2: Children Ever Born By Region and Religion
Region
Religion
Central Coast Eastern Nyanza Rift Valley Western µReceb Nsample
Catholic 2.56 3.15 2.78 3.46 3.43 3.35 3.17 1663
Christian 2.56 2.74 2.96 3.50 3.25 3.35 3.16 3996
Muslim 7.00 3.35 3.00 1.50 4.50 4.10 3.47 147
No Religion 2.00 4.27 4.00 7.00 3.56 3.00 4.07 192
µRceb 2.58 3.41 2.90 3.49 3.31 3.36 3.19
Nsample 728 465 1078 1208 1727 783 5994
µReceb (µ
R
ceb) denote, respectively, mean of ceb by Religion (Region)
− denotes a zero sample count.
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Table 3: Mean Education (Years) by Region and Ethnicity.
Region
Central Coast Eastern Nyanza Rift Western µEED
Valley
Ethnicity
Kalenjin - 7.0 7.3 7.0 6.5 7.0 6.5
Kamba 4.9 6.9 6.7 8.5 6.6 - 6.9
Kikuyu 7.9 9.6 8.7 7.7 7.4 6.7 8.1
Kisii 6.0 5.5 12.0 6.8 6.7 6.0 6.9
Luhya 6.8 8.4 9.6 6.0 6.0 7.1 7.0
Luo 6.7 8.2 8.8 5.9 6.9 8.1 6.3
Meru/Embu 8.2 7.2 6.5 10.0 8.6 - 6.6
Miji/Swa 11.0 5.1 4.0 - - 6.0 4.2
µRED 7.8 5.1 6.7 6.3 6.6 7.1 6.7
Note: µRED (µ
E
ED) denotes mean years of education by region (ethnicity).
− denotes zero sample count.
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Table 4: Children Ever Born.
Total Children Frequency Percentage
ever Born
0 1568 26.16
1 777 12.96
2 693 11.56
3 563 9.39
4 540 9.01
5 436 7.27
6 440 7.34
7 309 5.16
8 246 4.10
9 196 3.27
10 128 2.14
11 49 0.82
12 34 0.57
13 10 0.17
14 3 0.05
15 2 0.03
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Table 7: CEB Mean Rainfall; and Rainfall Seasonality by Region
Region CEB Mean Rainfall Rainfall
(1998) (2000) Seasonality
Central 2.51 40.79 2.28
Coast 2.86 75.21 2.52
Eastern 2.83 47.57 2.91
Nyanza 3.31 120.90 1.59
Rift Valley 3.22 71.44 2.02
Western 3.27 117.85 1.28
ALL 2.98 73.98 2.12
33
Table 8: Baseline Model: Ethnic and Interaction Effects
I II2 III
Dependent variable: ceb
Ethnicity
Kalenjin 0.060 0.041 0.200**
(0.282) (0.470) (0.002)
1.062 1.042 1.221
Kamba -0.066 -0.083 0.072
(0.334) (0.231) (0.294)
0.936 0.921 1.075
Kisii 0.018 0.005 0.144
(0.853) (0.957) (0.076)
1.019 1.005 1.154
Luhya 0.013 0.004 0.240**
(0.840) (0.955) (0.002)
1.013 1.004 1.272
Luo -0.052 -0.069 0.279**
(0.605) (0.500) (0.009)
0.949 0.933 1.321
Ethnic-Level Education
Kalenjin 0.192 0.347
(0.711) (0.684)
1.212 1.415
Kamba 0.383 0.069
(0.695) (0.960)
1.466 1.071
Kikuyu -0.989 -1.190
(0.235) (0.245)
0.372 0.304
Kissi -0.037 -0.570
(0.955) (0.189)
0.964 0.566
Luhya -0.169 -0.947*
(0.701) (0.042)
0.845 0.388
Luo 0.431 -0.848
(0.678) (0.579)
1.539 0.428
Ethnic-Level Conformist
Kalenjin 0.190**
(0.003)
1.210
Kamba 0.221**
(0.003)
1.247
Kikuyu 0.237***
(0.000)
1.267
Kissi 0.159***
(0.000)
1.172
Luhya 0.179*
(0.011)
1.196
Luo 0.123*
(0.049)
1.131
∗ (∗∗) [∗∗∗] if p < 0.05 (0.01) [0.001]
Diagnostics
rmse 0.346 0.347 0.473
J-Statistic 7.803 (0.253)
All specifications include the following individual, household, regional and cluster controls
Individual: age, age2, dummies for primary, secondary, and higher education.
Individual: dummies for listen to radio, know a place to test for aids
Household: dummies for tv and radio ownership, mortality
Household: dummies for: flooring (tile, wood); roof (tiled)
Cluster Controls: media access, electricity, water and size of cluster
Timing: Age at first marriage, knowledge of contraception
34
Table 9: Religion Model: Religion, and Interaction Effects
I II III
Dependent variable: ceb
Religion
Catholic -0.004 -0.005 -0.001
(0.852) (0.801) (0.952)
0.996 0.995 0.999
Muslim 0.037 0.045 0.053
(0.730) (0.688) (0.606)
1.038 1.046 1.055
No Religion 0.101 0.102 0.114*
(0.057) (0.059) (0.015)
1.107 1.108 1.120
Other Rel -0.047 -0.044 -0.038
(0.220) (0.247) (0.519)
0.954 0.957 0.963
Ethnic-Level Education
Kalenjin 0.384 0.044
(0.462) (0.947)
1.467 1.045
Kamba -0.436 -0.812
(0.639) (0.401)
0.646 0.444
Kikuyu -1.121 -1.433
(0.157) (0.087)
0.326 0.239
Kissi 0.500 -0.223
(0.402) (0.663)
1.649 0.800
Luhya 0.090 -0.044
(0.825) (0.916)
1.095 0.957
Luo -0.089 0.312
(0.924) (0.744)
0.915 1.367
Ethnic-Level Conformist
Kalenjin 0.047
(0.357)
1.048
Kamba 0.052
(0.283)
1.054
Kikuyu 0.126*
(0.017)
1.135
Kissi 0.074
(0.052)
1.077
Luhya 0.038
(0.484)
1.039
Luo -0.041
(0.532)
0.960
∗ (∗∗) [∗∗∗] if p < 0.05 (0.01) [0.001]
Diagnostics
rmse 0.294 0.294 0.332
J-Statistic 19.046 (0.004)
All specifications include the following individual, household, regional and cluster controls
Individual: age, age2, dummies for primary, secondary, and higher education.
Individual: dummies for listen to radio, know a place to test for aids
Household: dummies for tv and radio ownership, mortality
Household: dummies for: flooring (tile, wood); roof (tiled)
Cluster Controls: media access, electricity, water and size of cluster
Timing: Age at first marriage, knowledge of contraception
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Table 10: Ethnicity and Religion: Ethnicity and Interaction Effects
I II III
Dependent variable: ceb
Ethnicity
Kalenjin 0.059 0.039 0.196**
(0.292) (0.490) (0.002)
1.061 1.040 1.216
Kamba -0.065 -0.082 0.076
(0.340) (0.238) (0.277)
0.937 0.922 1.079
Kisii 0.017 0.004 0.143
(0.865) (0.971) (0.080)
1.017 1.004 1.154
Luhya 0.013 0.004 0.239**
(0.838) (0.954) (0.001)
1.013 1.004 1.270
Luo -0.053 -0.070 0.280**
(0.601) (0.496) (0.009)
0.949 0.932 1.323
Religion
Catholic -0.005 -0.006 -0.011
(0.810) (0.790) (0.508)
0.995 0.994 0.989
Muslim 0.011 0.021 0.127
(0.922) (0.855) (0.237)
1.011 1.021 1.136
No Religion 0.090 0.092 0.078
(0.082) (0.082) (0.221)
1.095 1.096 1.081
Other Rel -0.034 -0.034 -0.102
(0.385) (0.373) (0.332)
0.967 0.967 0.903
Ethnic-Level Education
Kalenjin 0.212 0.334
(0.686) (0.696)
1.236 1.396
Kamba 0.378 0.066
(0.698) (0.962)
1.459 1.069
Kikuyu -1.000 -1.236
(0.227) (0.224)
0.368 0.291
Kissi -0.001 -0.538
(0.998) (0.235)
0.999 0.584
Luhya -0.172 -0.952*
(0.696) (0.037)
0.842 0.386
Luo 0.437 -0.869
(0.674) (0.574)
1.548 0.420
Ethnic-Level Conformist
Kalenjin 0.194**
(0.003)
1.214
Kamba 0.224**
(0.003)
1.251
Kikuyu 0.240***
(0.000)
1.271
Kissi 0.162***
(0.000)
1.176
Luhya 0.181**
(0.009)
1.198
Luo 0.127*
(0.043)
1.136
∗ (∗∗) [∗∗∗] if p < 0.05 (0.01) [0.001]
Diagnostics
rmse 0.296 0.297 0.478
J-Statistic 7.493 (0.278)
All specifications include the following individual, household, regional and cluster controls
Individual: age, age2, dummies for primary, secondary, and higher education.
Individual: dummies for listen to radio, know a place to test for aids
Household: dummies for tv and radio ownership, mortality
Household: dummies for: flooring (tile, wood); roof (tiled)
Cluster Controls: media access, electricity, water and size of cluster
Timing: Age at first marriage, knowledge of contraception
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8 Appendix
A I: The Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator
In this paper we adopt the Generalised Method of Moments (gmm) estimator. A gmm esti-
mator is particularly suited to this particular context, since by using first-order conditions
only it allows for unobserved heterogeneity without a full set of parametric assumptions (i.e.
the Poisson variance assumption), and accommodates endogenous regressors. Whereas the
fully parametric mixture extensions of the Poisson regression model, such as the negative
binomial and zero-inflated Poisson models, impose statistical independence between the
unobserved heterogeneity and xi, a gmm framework readily accommodates dependence.
The GMM estimator minimises the (generalized) length of the empirical vector function
βˆGMM ≡ arg min
β∈Θ
ψN (w, β)
′Q˜−1N ψN (w, β), (4)
where w collects all observables including instrumental variables z. The nature of the con-
ditional moment restrictions, ψN (.) will depend upon whether we introduce an additive or
multiplicative error structure. As noted by Windmeijer and Santos-Silva (1996), although
multiplicative and additive models are observationally equivalent when only the first order
conditional mean is specified, there are differences in the presence of endogeneity and the
subsequent choice of instruments in the two specifications. Given E(ci|xi) = exp(x′iβ), the
additive model implies ci = exp(x
′
iβ) + ωi, with moment conditions E(z
′
i(ci − exp(x′iβ)).
The multiplicative model20 posits ci = exp(x
′
iβ)ωi, with moment conditions E(z
′
i(ci ·
exp(−x′iβ) − 1)). The multiplicative model handles regressors xi and error terms ωi in
a symmetric fashion. In addition given that for c not equal to zero, ln ci = x
′
iβ + ωi is
congruent with the Generalised Linear Model (glm).
Given a multiplicative error model ψN (w, β) = Z
′(c − κ(β)/κ(β)), κ(β) = exp(X′β).
We can the write (4) as
βˆGMM ≡ arg min
β∈Θ
[
1
n
Z′(c− κ(β)/κ(β))]′Q˜−1N [
1
n
Z′(c− κ(β)/κ(β))],
where Z = {zi} denotes an instrument matrix.21 Q˜N = Z′ΩZ denotes the optimal weight
matrix where Ω = (c − κ(β̂)/κ(β̂))2. κ(β̂) = exp(X′β̂) with β̂ a first step gmm estimator
based upon any weighting matrix.
A II: Conformist Effects
In the conditional mean specification (3) conformist effects are represented by cfi,g =
Ei(cg)− ci, where ci denotes the number of children (ceb) ever born to the ith woman, and
Ei(Cg) is the expectation of mean ceb held by the i
th woman resident in cluster g. This
20We note that given the use of a multiplicative model then any additional underlying regression error
would be absorbed by the unobserved heterogeneity term ωi. See Mullahy (1997) for an extended discussion
of this point.
21The glm estimator βglm accounts for both the endogeneity of one or more of the elements of x and the
intrinsic heteroscedasticity of κi(β) = exp(x
′
iβ).
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formulation contains two components: Ei(cg) represents the expectation of average fertility
of the ith woman in group g. Assuming that each woman possesses rational expectations
on Ei(cg), then individual expectations of average fertility behaviour in the group equals
the average behaviour such that Ei(cg) = N
−1
g
∑
i∈g ci, where Ng denotes the number of
individuals in the group. We argue that the rational expectations is valid given that clus-
ter sizes are small. For example, in Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Ioannides (2010), it is
argued that identification of social interaction effects may depend on whether individuals
are reacting to the expected or actual behaviour of others. If the sample sizes are small,
then assumptions such as complete information and the individual’s payoff depending on
the actual choices of others in the group, rather than on expectations about the average
choice of others, is justified by the study of interactions in relatively small groups. For
example, individuals may have incentives to conform to the behaviour of a small number
of appropriately defined neighbours whose actions they can ’observe’.
Below we represent these arguments more formally. Suppose Ui denotes the utility
function of household i, ci represents the number of children, li is all sources of satisfaction
to the husband and wife other than those arising from children, and xi denotes the vector
of socio-demographic characteristics which affect preferences. We extend the standard
atomistic utility model of fertility to incorporate a theory of social interactions, so we can
write
Vi = (U(ci, li,xi);S
j(ci, c
j
−i)) (5)
where Vi, total individual utility, is comprised of a private utility term U(ci, li,xi), and two
social utility terms: Sj(ci, c
j
−i) represents a social utility term for location or ethnicity j,
given by some function of the number of children choices made by all other residents of j;
cj−i = (c
j
1,c
j
2, ..., c
j
i−1, c
j
i+1, ..., n
j
Mj
), where Mj denotes the number of individuals in location
j. The extension allows us to capture that component of individual utility attributable to
a fertility choice ci, that is dependent upon the fertility choices of others. The ’others’ in
question may be those, for example, resident in the individual’s household, or others resident
in the local community for example, in the individual’s street or neighbourhood, religion
or members of the same ethnic group or tribe. Rewriting (5) as additive in individual and
social utility terms, and without loss of generality we have
Vi = U(ci, li,xi) + S
j(ni, c
j
−i) + εi. (6)
The addition of the social utility function Sj(.) represents a model in which we allow
individual behaviour to be partially determined by the collective decisions of a group.
Differentiating the Beckerian first-order conditions with respect to social interactions yields
the second-order conditions
κjil = ∂
2Sj(ci, cl)/∂ci∂cl > 0,
where κjil represents a measure of the disutility accruing to i from deviating from the
behaviour of l for i, l ∈ j.
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The form of social utility at the level of location j may be written as
Sj(ci, c
j
−i) =
−θ2
2
(ci − cj−i)2, (7)
where (7) represents social utility as a measure of conformism with ∂S(.)/∂ci = θ2(c
j
−i−ci).
Under (7) there is an incentive to conform to mean fertility behaviour within the group
with deviations from the mean penalised. If behaving like others confers additional status
on a woman, she may desire to conform.22
A III: The Identification Problem
The nature of the identification problem in models of social interaction is complex. Below
we consider a number of dimensions to this problem, namely: the presence of timing
effects, Manski’s reflection problem, the endogeneity of mean effects, and identification of
interaction effects. Such timing effects, for example younger cohorts marrying at later ages,
are important in that they determine, in part, the distance between the observed number of
children for any given woman and the mean number of children in the appropriate reference
group. This difference is central to our thesis, namely that changes in this distance will
impact upon ceb due to an interaction effect. Below we address each of these issues, and
in doing so outline our identification strategy.
In considering the relevance of the reflection problem for our particular application,
we first outline the identification problem in the linear-in-means social interaction model
as originally considered by Manski (1993), and more recently by Blume, Brock, Durlauf,
and Ioannides (2010) and Ioannides (2008). Since the question of identification is well
understood in the linear framework, this will provide a useful point of departure. Using
what it now common notation for this problem, a linear model of fertility behaviour may
be written as
ci = α+ q
′
iη + y
′
gλ+ κm
e
ig + εi, (8)
where qi denotes aK×1 vector of individual characteristics, yg is a L×1 vector of exogenous
(contextual) characteristics and meig denotes the expected average fertility of others in the
group held by the ith woman. η, λ, and κ denote unknown parameters. Under a rational
expectations assumption we may write meig = mg = α + q
′η + y′gλ. If we then impose the
restriction that the dimension of q is the same as yg, then mg may be written as
mg =
α+ (η + λ)yg
1− κ . (9)
In this context Manski’s reflection problem is immediately seen. Namely, any observed
correlation between an outcome ci and mg solely reflects the combined effect of mean-
group characteristics, yg, rather than endogenous interaction within a group. The genesis
of the reflection problem derives from the fact that in (8) we specify a model for children
ever born which is linear in an endogenous effect, meig, a vector of exogenous effects, yg,
22There may also be a compelling reason to conform if such status in the community bears economic
benefits, e.g. in the allocation of local resources.
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and a vector of individual characteristics, qi. If the number of exogenous and individual
effects are equivalent it then follows that the reduced form representation of the conditional
mean will be a function of yg.
23
There are a number of ways to circumvent the reflection problem. Within a linear
framework the simplest method is to impose a full set of zero restrictions on λ, thereby
adopting the assumption that any interactions are mediated solely by endogenous effects.
We note that such an approach is potentially problematic for making inference on multiplier
effects, since such restrictions may result in biased estimates of pure endogenous effects
(see Ioannides (2008)). This is important since policy proscriptions which follow from
endogenous versus exogenous effects are likely to be very different. However, the upside
of such an approach is that these restrictions automatically generate a possible set of
instruments (q) for mg.
24 Second, and as discussed earlier, identification is facilitated by
locating one or more individual level variables whose group level average does not enter the
conditional mean.
In this study the reflection problem is mitigated for a number of reasons. First, although
it is possible to conceive of a large number of exogenous effects, in the specific context
of fertility behaviour education plays a particularly prominent role. Numerous studies in
developed and developing countries have argued that education is the single most important
predictor of fertility decline. This is because education increases the opportunity cost of
women’s time, and encourages parents to have higher quality children, which then reduces
women’s fertility. Moreover, better educated women are likely to exert an influence on
less educated women if they provide effective role models for them. It is for this reason
that we focus primarily on this ex ogenous effect. Second, given that the conditional mean
specification represents a nonlinear transformation of the endogenous effect, then even if
the restriction q = yg held, identification would be achieved.
Endogeneity Bias
Given the form of endogenous conformist effects, namely cfi,g = Ei(cg − ci), we face a
variant of the the mean endogenous effects problem. In tackling this problem we adopt an
instrumental variable approach. However, the required condition that an instrument may
only impact ci indirectly through its association with cfi,g may not hold given that cfi,g is
a linear function which includes ci.
We address this problem by an appropriate specification of the conditional mean. Given
that the mean of a count process has non-negative support, we specify conditional mean
of ceb as an exponential function of a linear index in the regressors. As a consequence,
the otherwise linear dependence between the original error term, ωi, and the instrument
is removed given the imposition of a restriction on the support of the conditional mean
using the exponential function25. It is important to emphasise that the nature of our
23See Manski (1993) and Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Ioannides (2010) for further details.
24See, for example, Case and Katz (1991) and Gaviria and Raphael (2001). See Kawaguchi (2004) for an
approach which utilises subjective perceptions of peers’ average behaviour, instead of average behaviour.
25Ioannides (2008) in an extensive overview of the empirics of social interactions also notes that nonlin-
earities may be useful in providing identification in models of social interactions.
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identification strategy is not dependent on a highly specific set of parametric assumptions
but rather a minimal set of assumptions to ensure the non-negativity of the conditional
mean. Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Ioannides (2010) make a similar argument in outlining
conditions for identification in other nonlinear social interaction models.26.
Given that the number of instruments excluded exceeds the number of endogenous
variables, our estimating equation is overidentified, and we may evaluate the validity of
our instruments by testing whether the excluded instruments are independent of the error
process using the J-test (see Hansen (1982)). This statistic is the value of ceb objective
function, evaluated at the efficient ceb estimator. Under the joint null hypothesis of correct
model specification and the validity of the orthogonal conditions, the J-statistic is given by
J(β̂ceb) = nZ
′û(Z′Ω̂cZ)−1Z′û ∼ χ2l−k,
where û denotes the residuals and l-k denotes the number of overidentifying restrictions.
Ω̂C represents a form of the error covariance matrix which is robust to arbitrary intra-
cluster correlation.27 A rejection of the null may then result from the instruments not
satisfying the orthogonality conditions given they are not exogenous or because they are
incorrectly excluded.
26See Brock and Durlauf (2003) for a discussion of identification in the multinomial choice model with
social interactions.
27Note that cluster robust standard errors are asymptotic in the number of clusters (M). Kezdi (2004)
shows for a given type of model that M=50 will generate reasonable inference (see White (1984)). Baum
et al (2003) provide a useful discussion of the construction of the Ω̂C matrix.
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